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JUDGING JUDGES: SECURING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE BY USE OF JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
Penny J. White*
INTRODUCTION
The current national debate surrounding judicial independence
arguably began in 1996 when both presidential candidates engaged
in disingenuous political rhetoric about United States District
Judge Harold Baer.) The national discussion about judicial inde-
pendence2 is by no means a new discussion. It dates back to the
* Penny J. White is an associate professor of law at the University of Tennessee
College of Law. Professor White is a former trial judge, appellate judge, and associ-
ate justice on the Tennessee Supreme Court.
1. During the 1996 presidential campaign, more than 200 members of Congress
wrote President Clinton a letter regarding a suppression ruling made by United States
District Judge Harold Baer, Jr., of the Southern District of New York. The letter
asked the president to call for the resignation of the judge. On March 23, the Repub-
lican presidential candidate Robert Dole was quoted in the New York Times as saying
that Judge Baer "ought to be impeached instead of reprimanded." Jon 0. Newman,
The Judge Baer Controversy, 80 JUDICATURE 156, 158 (1997). The criticism of Judge
Baer continued and became the springboard for a general attack on appointments to
the federal bench made by Clinton and approved by a Democratic Congress. After
Dole suggested that Judge Baer be impeached based on the ruling, Clinton spokesper-
sons announced that Baer would be asked to resign, and that if he did not, the presi-
dent would consider calling for his impeachment. Id. Eventually, the Baer debate
subsided, perhaps as a result of Judge Baer's subsequent ruling reconsidering the
grant of the motion and denying suppression instead. Id.
But the underlying issue did not so easily evaporate. Senator Dole charged that
Clinton had appointed judges who were "dismantling those guard rails that protect
society from the predatory, the violent, the anti-social elements in our midst." Robert
Cohen, Dole Attacks Clinton on Judicial Appointments, STAR LEDGER, Apr. 20, 1996,
at 3. Dole singled out individual judges who he named to the Clinton "Hall of
Shame." Id. Dole's campaign staff characterized the speech as an "opening shot for
the November 5 election, and said it would be a 'major theme' in the months ahead."
Id.
2. The Baer controversy sparked national debate and comment and even interna-
tional discussion. In April 1996, at the 52nd United Nations Commission on Human
Rights in Geneva, the special rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers
made the following comment:
Threat[s] to judicial independence appears all pervasive. As seen judicial
independence was recently threatened in a developed country like the
United Kingdom.
What is of greater concern is the latest outburst in the United States over
a decision of a federal judge given some two months ago to exclude certain
evidence in a drugs related trial. From information received just two days
ago, the President of the United States was reported to have said through his
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early common law,3 the formation of the American democracy, and
the constitutionalization of the American judicial system.
When the colonists declared their independence from England,
they compiled a list of grievances setting forth justifications for
their actions. One of the listed grievances against King George III
in the American Declaration of Independence concerned the
King's control of the British judiciary. Categorizing the King's
control of the British judiciary as an obstruction of justice, the pa-
triots declared that "[the King] has made Judges dependent on his
Will alone for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and
Payment of their salaries."4 Control of the judiciary, however, was
not a creation of King George III's reign.5 It predated his reign by
decades, and in fact had been somewhat ameliorated prior to
George III's reign when King James II was deposed during the
Glorious Revolution of 1688.6
Nonetheless, at the time of the American Revolution the foun-
ders of the new country remained concerned about a controlled
judiciary.7 Although comparatively little time was spent debating
spokesman that if the judge did not change his ruling the President would
call for the judge's resignation. Though attempts were made subsequently to
distance the President from the words of his spokesman, the damages appear
to have been done. It was further reported that Senator Dole had called for
the same judge's impeachment.
These political attacks led four judges of the Federal Appeals Court to
come in defense of the judge concerned with a public statement which read,
inter alia, "These attacks do a grave disservice to the principle of an inde-
pendent judiciary and most significantly, mislead the public as to the role of
judges in a constitutional democracy."
... Obviously the President and the Senator, in the heat of their political
campaigns, lost sight of constitutionalism.
Id. at 164.
3. At common law, the principle of judicial independence was absorbed in the
doctrine Nemo Judex In Re Sua: "No man may be a judge in his own cause." Dr.
Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 8 Coke 114(a) (C.P. 1610). Ironically, Lord Coke,
chief justice of the King's Bench, ruled against the Board of Censors of the Royal
College of Physicians, an adjudicator of a physician's incompetence and a beneficiary
of the resulting fine. Based on this decision, King James I removed Lord Coke from
the bench. STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEVANCES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH" 1621-28, (1979).
4. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 7, 8 (U.S. 1776).
5. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF FREEDOM: A CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY OF ENGLAND 121-23, 150, 190-91 (1965).
6. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 195 (7th ed. 1956). After the
Glorious Revolution, judges in England were appointed for good behavior, rather
than "at the King's pleasure"; their salaries were set by Parliament. Id.
7. In 1789, in a speech in which then Congressman James Madison proposed the
amendments to the United States Constitution that would become the Bill of Rights,
he suggested that the safety of the enumerated rights contained in the amendments
1054
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and structuring the judiciary in the proposed three-branch govern-
ment, the proposed Constitution provided for permanent tenure
for federal judges "during Good Behaviour" and forbid any reduc-
tion in federal judicial salaries.8 The federal judges were empow-
ered to hear a large variety of cases, although Congress maintained
the authority to expand or contract the size as well as the jurisdic-
tion of the courts.9 Additionally, the intermingled tripartite system
of government with its "great organizing principle, the separation
of powers" doctrine,10 reiterated the commitment of the founders
to a separate and independent judiciary.
The commitment to the formation of a new government with an
independent judiciary in no way assured that the doctrine of judi-
cial independence would not be challenged. From the very begin-
ning of the American judiciary1' until the Judge Baer fiasco in 1996
would rest largely in the federal courts' hands. "Independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of these rights .... They will
be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or
Executive; they will naturally be led to resist every encroachment upon rights ex-
pressly stipulated in the Constitution by the declaration of rights." ROBERT SHNAYER-
SON, THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
54 (Adele Westbrook ed., 1985).
8. U.S. CONST. art. III.
9. Id. at art. III, §§ 1, 2.
10. Id. at art. I, II, & III. ROBERT SHNAYERSON, THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 55 (Adele Westbrook ed., 1985). The
intermingled constitutional plan of the United States was described by Louis H. Pol-
lak, former dean of the Yale Law School, as follows:
Congress can make laws; but a President, whose salary is inviolable during
his term can veto them; Congress can, in its turn, pass laws over the Presi-
dent's veto, but the ultimate impact of any laws enacted depends, first, upon
the vigor with which the President enforces the laws, and, second, on the
interpretations put upon them by the judges-appointed by the President,
with the Senate's assent, but thereafter holding office for life. On the other
hand, the President has to reckon with Congress' power to withhold needed
appropriations-and he also has to reckon with Congress' correlative power
to inquire into the way in which sums appropriated to the executive depart-
ment are actually utilized. Similarly, the judges are not unaware of Con-
gress' latent power to contract their jurisdiction. And both the executive
and the judiciary are potential targets of the congressional power of
impeachment.
Id. at 55 (quoting from 1 Louis H. POLLAK, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME
COURT 74 (1996).
11. In the early days of the United States Supreme Court, the Justices sat as circuit
justices as well as members of the Supreme Court. This required each Justice to travel
a large circuit and hear, as a court of original and appellate jurisdiction, cases that
might ultimately reach the "one Supreme Court" created by the United States Consti-
tution. For both reasons-the arduousness of the task as well as the incompatibility
of sitting at trial, on appeal, and at the Supreme Court level-the Justices ardently
opposed their circuit judges tasks. They expressed their opposition as early as 1790,
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and after,12 the doctrine has been questioned, challenged, and at
times, fiercely opposed.13
I. THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
One who clearly understands judicial independence cannot com-
prehend how it could be opposed. A judiciary that is not indepen-
dent of the other branches of government is subject to their
control. Judicial decisions would be influenced, if not dictated, by
political pressures, threats, and intimidation. A nation whose judi-
ciary was controlled by the legislative or executive branch would
offer no stability to its citizens or corporations as to their legal
rights or responsibilities.
The effect of a controlled judiciary is often illustrated by refer-
ence to intrusion upon personal liberties. The effect of a depen-
dent judiciary on commercial interests, however, would be equally
devastating. Consistent enforcement of contract rights, zoning
laws, and employment regulations are crucial to business develop-
ment. The coexistence in America of a stable, independent court
system and a thriving national economy is hardly coincidental. In-
vestors and developers cannot risk doing business in an unstable
legal environment where their legal rights depend on who is in
power. They depend on uniform application of the law by a judici-
ary that is not swayed by either majority opinion or political power,
but is instead guided by precedent and the rule of law.
by writing the president and Congress, but were not totally relieved of their circuit
duties until the passage of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891. At different
times between 1790 and 1891, Congress seemed posed to relieve the justices of their
circuit riding duties only to decline to do so, often curiously close in time to a disfa-
vored ruling by the Court. COMM'N ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE U.S. CONSTITU-
TION, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS BEGINNINGS & ITS JUSTICES
1790-1991, at 12-19 (1992).
12. A very recent example of interference with judicial independence can be
found in the United States Congress's failure to confirm Missouri Supreme Court
Justice Ronnie White as a federal district judge. Justice White was labeled as "soft on
the death penalty," despite his varied record on capital cases. See Charles Babington
& Joan Biskupic, Senate Rejects Judicial Nominee, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1999, at A01.
This mislabeling results in a de facto qualification requiring judges to rule in accord
with congressional wishes in order to be appointed to the federal bench.
13. Some historically significant challenges to judicial independence in the United
States include the following: the congressional reaction to the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); the impeachment trial of Justice Sa-
muel Chase; the Progressive Party platform of Theodore Roosevelt, which proposed a
congressional veto of Supreme Court decisions; the Franklin D. Roosevelt court-
packing plan; the "Impeach Earl Warren" movement; and the modern-day congres-
sional litmus tests for federal court appointments.
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If no free-enterprise capitalist could sensibly oppose judicial in-
dependence, why do so many of our national leaders assert posi-
tions in direct conflict with it? The cynical answer is that the
assertions are pure political rhetoric gauged to be popular with the
voters that, although dangerous to freedom and prosperity, are
nonetheless successful because of the dearth of understanding of
the American judiciary and its role in our society. A less cynical,
but even more frightening answer is that the dearth of understand-
ing extends beyond the realm of average citizens and includes na-
tional political leaders.' 4
II. DEFINING THE CONTROVERSY: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Lawyers and judges, who should understand the significance of
judicial independence,15 cannot attribute all of the blame to igno-
rance and indifference. The judicial system itself creates some of
the confusion.
In the vast majority of states, judges are subject to the vote 6
either for initial selection or retention. 7 In most cases, citizens are
given the right to vote for judges just as they are for legislators,
governors, and presidents. In those few states where citizens
neither vote directly for judges nor decide whether to retain them,
14. Contrast, for example, President Clinton's response to the Dole attack on
Judge Baer during the 1996 campaign, with President Mandela's response to the
South Africa Constitutional Court's decision striking down legislation aimed at imple-
menting his executive agenda. In re State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (3)
SALR 94 (CC), reprinted in 16 HUM. RTs. L.J. 154 (1995). "Mandela immediately
made a public announcement that the court had spoken and its decision must be im-
plemented." Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE
165, 173 (1997).
15. Unfortunately, examples abound of both lawyers and judges who have either
not understood the principle or who have abused it. The president of a bar associa-
tion announced that people were beginning to understand that it was easier to "buy a
judge" than to buy an entire legislative body. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the
Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133, 1133.
Judges routinely campaign on platforms designed to curry favor with voters. See, e.g.,
Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759
(1995).
16. This article should not be taken as an expression of opinion on any judicial
selection or election method. The propriety of judicial elections, partisan and nonpar-
tisan, retention and competitive, is a topic for another day.
17. See Am. Judicature Soc'y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE
AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS, SUMMARY OF INITIAL SELECTION METHOD (6-
11-96 revision) (on file in the author's office and available from the American Judica-
ture Society); Uelmen, supra note 15, at 1133, 1134 n.6 & 7.
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judicial selections generally occur through executive or legislative
appointment with sitting judges generally subject to periodic legis-
lative or executive approval. In only three states is the judiciary
granted quasi-life tenure after appointment, 8 without subsequent
review or retention. While all federal judges are appointed for life,
the congressional confirmation process is certainly not apolitical. 19
To the electorate, it must seem that judges who campaign for
their positions20 are political candidates. It follows that judges who
raise funds, advertise, and seek support from voters21 must make
promises of future conduct and assert their beliefs and opinions in
political platforms.
Just as other political candidates are politically accountable to
the voters, the citizenry may believe that judges should be account-
able. Political accountability requires adherence to one's platform,
fulfillment of one's promises, and responsiveness to public senti-
ment. Failure to display political accountability is a justification for
campaigning against, voting against, and replacing an office holder.
If a judge is viewed as "just another politician" who is expected to
make and keep promises and to respond to public pressure or sen-
timent, justice is unlikely. The view of a judge as a politician is
inconsistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of
American judges required to preserve an independent judiciary.22
If the principle of judicial independence is inconsistent with the
typical view of political accountability, does it follow that indepen-
dence and accountability are concepts in conflict? If so, recent crit-
18. Judges are appointed until age seventy in Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
In Rhode Island, judges are appointed for life. Am. Judicature Soc'y, supra note 17.
19. See e.g., Charles E. Schumer, Judging by Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001,
at A19.
20. The conflict between judicial independence and judicial campaign fundraising
is very significant. For the most part, however, that topic is beyond the scope of this
article. See generally Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges Campaign Financing: Are
State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57
(1985); Mark Hansen, The High Cost of Judging, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 44; Sheila
Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, NATION, Jan. 26, 1998 at 11.
21. It is true that judicial campaigns are subject to restrictions set forth in the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct. These restrictions affect fund-raising, advertising,
and the content of campaigns. They subject violators to disciplinary action. Nonethe-
less, judicial campaigns, viewed from the perspective of lay citizens, appear no differ-
ent from other political campaigns.
22. Judges in virtually every state and in the federal court system take oaths to
"uphold the Constitution and the laws of the United States." Additionally, every
state subscribes to some version of the American Bar Association Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to uphold the independence of the judiciary.
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1990). See text accompanying
notes 33-40 infra.
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icisms of unaccountable judges and movements to "reign in" an
imperialistic judiciary23 might have merit. But the obvious answer
is that independence and accountability are not conflicting princi-
ples. Rather, they stand in juxtaposition to one another. Judges
are accountable. Their accountability, however, is not political ac-
countability to individuals, party platforms, majority preferences,
or public pressure. A judge's accountability is to the law.
III. CLARIFYING THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The suggestion that judicial independence is incompatible with
judicial accountability is premised on a misunderstanding or misin-
terpretation of judicial independence. The correct interpretation,
provided by its historical beginnings, is that judicial independence
is the independence of judges in their judicial capacity from control
by inapproriate external forces, pressures, or threats.24
More, and occasionally, less eloquent explanations of judicial in-
dependence have been offered. An early Supreme Court decision
defined judicial independence as the freedom of a judge in decid-
ing a case to "act upon his own convictions, without apprehension
of personal consequences." 25 Similarly, a federal district judge de-
fines judicial independence as "[t]he freedom of judicial officers to
decide particular cases without ... consideration of ... preferment
23. Edwin Meese III & Rhett DeHart, Reigning in the Federal Judiciary, 80 JUDI-
CATURE 178 (1997). In former Attorney General Meese's opinion, "The federal judi-
ciary has strayed far beyond its proper functions." Meese lists five strategies that
Congress must use "to reign in the active federal judiciary and return it to its rightful
place in our democracy." Id. at 178. The strategies listed are (1) using the confirma-
tion authority to block the appointment of "activist judges"; (2) stripping the Ameri-
can Bar Association of its role in the federal judicial selection process; (3) exercising
Congress's power to limit federal court jurisdiction; (4) amending the Constitution to
allow future constitutional amendments to be ratified by the states without congres-
sional approval; and (5) stopping the federalization of crime and the expansion of
litigation in federal courts. Id. at 181-83.
24. For many years the standard for judicial disqualification of federal judges was
the so-called external source doctrine. Under this doctrine, a lawyer moving to recuse
a federal judge from participating in a case based on allegations of bias had to estab-
lish that the source of the bias was "external" to the courtroom. After the case of
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), the external source doctrine was replaced
with a new totality of the circumstances standard, but whether the bias was alleged to
have come from an external source remains an important factor for consideration.
25. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 337 (1872) ("For it is a general princi-
ple of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial
officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.").
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or retribution. ' 26 The American Judicature Society, long a pro-
moter of judicial independence, describes the principle as one that
frees judges "[t]o act in the best interests of justice rather than be
beholden to political obligations. ' 27 Others suggest that to be in-
dependent a judge need only be unbiased.
The common denominator in all accurate descriptions of judicial
independence is that judicial independence does not serve to re-
move a judge from accountability. Rather, it serves to remove a
judge from accountability to the wrong sources.
Judicial independence is not the freedom of a judge to decide
cases based on personal whim or caprice, nor is it the freedom of a
judge to decide cases based on personal viewpoints of what the law
ought to require. A judge remains accountable to the fair applica-
tion of the law regardless of the judge's endorsement of or belief in
the law.
IV. DEFINING JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability at its simplest, means answerability or responsi-
bility. In the context of judicial accountability, the question is to
whom or what are judges answerable and responsible.
Those who espouse a commitment to judicial independence
often speak in terms of judicial accountability to the "rule of
law."'28 Conversely, those who would undermine the importance of
judicial independence argue for accountability to the citizens or
constituents. 29 Accountability to something as esoteric and unde-
fined as the "rule of law," they argue, is no accountability at all.3°
It is more meaningful to attempt to identify to whom or what in
particular a judge should be accountable, than to debate whether
the "rule of law" is precise enough to allow accountability to it.
To whom should a judge answer? Posing and probing alternative
responses to that question simplifies the answer. Assume that a
judge is accountable to his or her "citizens" or "constituents."
26. Judicial Independence Revisited, JUDGES' J., Winter 1998, at 28, 46 (quoting
Judge David F. Levi, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
California).
27. Promoting Judicial Independence, 80 JUDICATURE 152 (1997).
28. See, e.g., William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 723 (dis-
cussing generally the meaning and usage of the phrase "rule of law").
29. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 779, 780 (Accountability in our government must run ultimately to the
governed.").
30. See id. ("That unelected judges have been left to interpret the equivocal will of
elected representatives must sometimes seem the final measure of our government's
fall from grace.").
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How would those groups be identified?31 What would accountabil-
ity to them entail? Would it require that a judge base his or her
decisions on the group's opinion about the issue in the case? If so,
would a consensus of opinion be required or would the judge be
expected to follow the opinion of the majority of the group? How
would either a consensus or majority opinion be determined? How
and when, if ever, could a previous consensus or majority opinion
be reexamined?
Assume instead that a judge is accountable to the other branches
of government. Which branch? Would state judges be accountable
only to state legislative and executive officials and federal judges
only accountable to the Congress and president? If accountability
included responsibility to rule in accord with the selected branch's
viewpoint, how and when would the controlling viewpoint be de-
termined? Would accountability to branch or either jurisdiction,
state or federal, mean that judicial "precedent" would change each
time an administration changed?
When logically explored, the notion that judicial accountability
includes adherence to the viewpoints of citizens, government offi-
cials, or identified groups is exposed for what it is-a preposterous
conflict with the essence of our tripartite system of government.
Asserting that judges cannot be required to adhere to the view-
points of any individual or group is not an assertion that judges
should not be accountable for their conduct. It is crucial, however,
that a judge's conduct be measured by reference to appropriate
sources when evaluating whether the judge has acted accountably.
V. SOURCES FOR EVALUATING JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
What are the requirements of accountable judicial conduct? The
requirements flow from at least four sources. First, judges at every
level are required to obey and uphold state and federal constitu-
tions. The traditional oath of office taken by judges requires ad-
herence to those documents. Second, judges are required to follow
31. An attempt to identify a judge's constituents proves the absurdity of the no-
tion that judges are to be held accountable to their so-called constituency. Are only
those who voted in a judicial election "constituents?" Does that include those who
voted against the judge as well as for the judge? If the judge has limited jurisdiction,
are only those with matters within the court's jurisdiction constituents? What hap-
pens when a newcomer moves to the area? Does the newcomer become a "constitu-
ent" only after voting in the first election in which eligibility attaches, or does the
"constituent" status from the newcomer's previous residence carry over to the place
of the new residence? And what about minors-do they only become "constituents"
when they vote for the first time after reaching the age of majority?
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the state and federal law, so long as it does not conflict with consti-
tutional principles. Third, except for those few judges who sit on
courts of last resort, judges are required to follow judicial prece-
dent. Finally, judges in all United States jurisdictions are required
to follow their jurisdictions' canons of judicial ethics.
The requirement that judges follow the constitutions, laws, and
judicial precedents is self-explanatory; adherence to the canons of
judicial ethics may be less so. Like lawyers, judges who violate the
ethical code for judges are subject to discipline, including removal
from office.32 Since judges may be subject to official discipline for
ethical violations, the specifics of judicial ethics requirements are
important components of any judicial accountability system.
Most states have adopted the American Bar Association's
Model Code of Judicial Conduct or some variation thereof.33 The
Code is divided into several canons, usually seven, that set forth
either mandatory or suggested rules pertaining to judicial conduct
on and off the bench.34 Although the order of the canons vary
greatly from state to state, they generally address judicial indepen-
dence, competence, integrity, diligence, impartiality, and impropri-
32. Modern day judicial ethics enforcement tribunals are an outgrowth of discon-
tent over judicial accountability methods. The only method provided in the United
States Constitution for the removal of a federal judge from office is by impeachment.
U.S. CONST. art. III, §1, art. II, §2, art. I, §3. Following that lead, early state constitu-
tions provided for impeachment of state judges as well. In most states, no other de-
vice for removal or discipline of state judges existed. The impeachment process was
arduous and difficult. In addition to modifying judicial selection methods (as a sepa-
rate means of accountability), judicial reformers began to create additional methods
for disciplining judges when their misconduct did not merit removal, but demanded
some sanction. In 1947, New York created the first "Court on the Judiciary," a special
court convened to hear cases of judicial misconduct and disability. It was not until
1960, however, that a state created a judicial discipline office that could receive and
investigate complaints, convene hearings, and make disciplinary recommendations to
the state supreme court. Since 1960, judicial conduct commissions and hearing tribu-
nals have been created by constitutional amendment, statute, or court rule in virtually
every jurisdiction. See generally Edward J. Schoenbaum, A Historical Look At Judicial
Discipline, 54 CM.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1977).
33. Peter A. Joy, A Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading By Example, 52
S.C. L. REV. 667, 692 (2001) ("Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia base
their judicial ethics codes to varying degrees on the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct....").
34. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct is written in mandatory terms.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990). Each canon begins with the words "A
judge shall" or "A judge shall not." Id. Some states, however, in addition to modify-
ing specific standards within the Code, have phrased their canons in terms of what
judges "should" or "should not" do. A third category of states, by far the smallest,
has differentiated between mandatory and preferred canons requiring, in some in-
stances, that judges "shall" or "shall not" and, in other instances, that judges "should"
or "should not."
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ety, as well as extra-judicial and political activities. The canons
require, for example, that judges "uphold the integrity and inde-
pendence of the judiciary"; 35 "avoid impropriety and the appear-
ance of impropriety in all activities "1;36 "perform the duties of
judicial office impartially and diligently";37 and "refrain from inap-
propriate political activity." 38
The often-broad language of the Code is, at times, supplemented
with very specific directives. Noteworthy are two of Canon 5's re-
quirements pertaining to inappropriate political activity:
(A)(3) A candidate for a judicial office:
(d) shall not:
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office
other than the faithful and impartial perform-
ance of the duties of the office;
(ii) make statements that commit or appear to com-
mit the candidate with respect to cases, contro-
versies or issues that are likely to come before
the court .. .
(A)(1) A judge or a candidate for election to judicial office
shall not:
(a) act as a leader or hold an office in a political
organization,
(b) publicly endorse or publicly oppose another candi-
date for public office;
(c) make speeches on behalf of a political organization;
(d) attend political gatherings; or
(e) solicit funds or pay an assessment to or make a con-
tribution to a political organization or candidate, or
purchase tickets for political party dinners or other
functions.4'
35. Id. at Canon 1 ("[An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to
justice in our society. A judge should... observe those standards [of conduct] so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved.").
36. Id. at Canon 2(A), (B) ("A judge shall ... act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary .... A
judge shall not allow family, social, political, or other relationships to influence the
judge's judicial conduct or judgment.").
37. Id. at Canon 3(B)(1). ("A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain pro-
fessional competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public
clamor or fear of criticism."); id. at (E)(1) ("A judge shall disqualify himself in a
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
38. Id. at Canon 5.
39. Id. at Canon 5(A)(3)(a), (d)(i), & (ii).
40. Id. at Canon 5(A)(1)(a)-(e).
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If any doubt about the appropriateness of a nexus between
judges and politics is left by the general language of the Canons,
that doubt is removed by the specific limitations imposed on judges
and candidates for judicial offices by the subdivisions of Canon 5
VI. MEASURING JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
An assertion that judges are accountable to constitutional, statu-
tory, and case law as well as to judicial ethical codes does not com-
plete the accountability inquiry. If it is appropriate for judges to
follow the proscribed law and ethics, and if their failure to do so is
a legitimate basis for finding them unaccountable, how can those
who select or elect judges evaluate a judge's conduct and accounta-
bility in office? If we would remove judges from common politics
and take away campaigning based on fund-raising, promise-mak-
ing, and issue-positioning as a basis for electing or selecting judges,
what can we offer in replacement? If we oppose efforts to elect
and select judges based upon political accountability and suggest
the existence of more appropriate accountability sources, how can
a judge's compliance with appropriate sources of accountability be
determined?
In order for citizens to maintain popular accountability of the
judiciary, citizens must be involved in evaluating judicial per-
formance .... They need to (1) gather information about judi-
cial performance from the citizen's point of view and (2)
communicate their opinions to the judiciary. ... [T]he main ve-
hicle of judicial accountability is the [election or retention of
judges]. Yet this.., cannot serve its function if citizens do not
have the interest to vote or the information necessary to make
informed decisions.4'
A. Judicial Evaluation by Bar Polls and Media Polls
Because many have opined that the quality of justice is mea-
sured by the quality of judges, judicial evaluation has been a sub-
ject of debate since the late 1800s. The first method of evaluation
was polling, conducted by state and local bar associations and in-
tended to gauge the bar's preference for one judicial candidate or
41. Anne Rankin Mahoney, Citizen Evaluation of Judicial Performance: The Colo-
rado Experience, 72 JUDICATURE 211, 216 (1989).
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another.42 The early polls were mostly straw polls that evolved into
performance polls seeking not only the lawyers' preference, but the
lawyers' evaluations as well.43 Performance polls asked lawyers to
evaluate judges based on certain predetermined criteria.44 The re-
sults of the polls were used to try and affect the performance of
sitting judges as well as the vote of the electorate.45
For obvious reasons, judicial performance evaluations by lawyers
are problematic. The premise of any valid evaluation system is that
those conducting the evaluation are familiar with those being eval-
uated. While lawyers may generally be qualified to evaluate the
criteria essential to "good" judging, are all lawyers equally quali-
fied to evaluate the judges in a given jurisdiction? Should only
those lawyers who have litigation practices be allowed to evaluate
judges? Should only those lawyers who have appeared before a
judge in a sufficient number of matters be allowed to evaluate
performance?
Even assuming a sufficient representative sample of knowledge-
able lawyers as respondents, bar polls are riddled with difficulties.
Despite efforts at maintaining respondent confidentiality, the con-
tent of a response may reveal the identity of a respondent. Law-
yers may fear this possibility and give guarded responses rather
than candid ones. Lawyers may also evaluate judges based on their
personal track record, rather than on objective, appropriate crite-
ria. In extreme cases, groups of lawyers may use the bar poll as
campaign fodder for a judicial candidate whom they support over
an incumbent.
42. See JAMES H. GUTERMAN & ERROL E. MEIDINGER, IN THE OPINION OF THE
BAR: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF BAR POLLING PRACTICES (1977); S. Flanders, Evalu-
ating the Judges: How Should the Bar Do It?, 61 JUDICATURE 304 (1978).
43. Richard L. Aynes, Evaluation of Judicial Performance: A Tool for Self-Im-
provement, 8 PEPP. L. REV. 255, 266-70 (1981).
44. See Joel H. Goldstein, Bar Poll Ratings as the Leading Influence on Non-Parti-
san Judicial Election, 63 JUDICATURE 376, 379 (1980) (explaining that the Louisville
Bar Association asked each of its members to rate the candidates on "(1) integrity; (2)
judicial temperament; (3) legal ability; (4) impartiality, freedom from bias and
prejudice; and (5) industry, diligence and promptness").
45. Id. at 377. But see Aynes, supra note 43, at 268 ("As a general rule the results
of such polls are utilized by third parties, such as voters or public officials, in making
choices about retaining or promoting the judges who were the subjects of the poll. In
contrast, as used in this article, the proposal to evaluate judicial performance refers to
a systematic, multi-faceted attempt to gather data, subjective and objective, which
would give judges insight into their performance in such a manner as to reinforce that
performance when it is desirable and to spur improvement where improvement could
be obtained.").
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On the coattails of the dubious bar polls came media polls-ef-
forts by newspapers to evaluate judges based on surveys developed
and administered by the media.46 Often these polls were con-
ducted in conjunction with bar associations.47 Though possibly
well intended, these programs suffer from the same evils that haunt
bar polls, including unreliability, insufficiency sampling, and
unknowledgeable evaluators.
B. Alternative Judicial Performance Evaluation Methods
To supplement problematic bar polls and evaluations, as early as
1979 states began to explore alternative ways to evaluate judicial
performance. Alaska and New Jersey were the pioneers in judicial
evaluation systems. The New Jersey Supreme Court responded to
a recommendation to adopt a comprehensive judicial evaluation
program for the purpose of improving the quality of justice. 48 Sim-
ilarly, the Colorado Supreme Court began an initiative aimed at
evaluating judges for dual purposes: improvement of the quality of
justice and informing the public about the judiciary.4 9
One of the specific charges of the Colorado Committee on Judi-
cial Performance was to ascertain whether dissemination of judicial
performance evaluations to the public would make "retention elec-
tions [which were used in Colorado] more meaningful" to the pub-
lic. 5° Despite the identification of risks inherent in publishing the
results of judicial evaluation, Colorado ultimately decided that the
potential benefits, including a more informed and better-educated
electorate, outweighed the risks.5'
Colorado, Alaska, and New Jersey were not alone in creating
more reliable methods of judicial performance evaluation. Ari-
zona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire,
46. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE,
GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE ii (1985) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES] (discussing judicial evaluations conducted by the media).
47. Aynes, supra note 43, at 293 (discussing the possibility that the media may
work in conjunction with bar associations in conducting judicial evaluations).
48. Id. at 262 ("In New Jersey, the State Supreme Court established a Special
Committee on Judicial Evaluation and Performance, and that committee had submit-
ted its report calling for [a program of judicial evaluation] in early March of 1978.").
49. Id.
50. See infra note 51.
51. The stated goals of the existing Colorado Judicial Performance Evaluation
Program are "to provide persons voting on the retention of justices and judges with
fair, responsible, and constructive information about judicial performance and to pro-
vide justices, judges, and magistrates with useful information concerning their own
performances." COL. REV. STAT. §13-5.5-101 (2001 Cum. Supp.).
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Utah, and the courts of the Navaho Nation established judicial
evaluation programs by 1995, most of which were established to
improve judicial skills.5 2 Alaska, however, as well as Arizona, Ha-
waii, and to a lesser degree, Utah and Tennessee, ultimately devel-
oped judicial evaluation programs that would be used in the
election or selection process.53
State judicial performance evaluations varied in many ways.
Some were authorized by court rule, some dictated by statute, and
some produced by administrative orders or bar association recom-
mendations.54 The evaluation methods were equally varied. Most
programs used survey instruments or questionnaires, but recipients
of those instruments were diverse.55 Some evaluation programs in-
cluded courtroom observations, videotaped proceedings, back-
ground investigations, and interviews. Others required an in-depth
analysis of caseload management data, disciplinary records, and
health records.56
C. ABA Guidelines for Judicial Performance Evaluations
As states experimented with judicial evaluation programs and
struggled to identify relevant evaluation criteria, a committee of
the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association de-
veloped a concept paper suggesting the creation of objective judi-
cial evaluation guidelines. 7 A Special Committee on the
Evaluation of Judicial Performance was named in 1983.58 Two task
forces, one on methodology and one on evaluation criteria, were
52. See A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review In Arizona: Goals, Practi-
cal Effects and Concerns, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 643, 725 n.6 (1998).
53. ARIZ. CONST. art. 6; ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.07.060, 22.10.150, 22.15.195 (2000);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201 (2001 Supp.); HAW. Sup. CT. R. 19; UTAH CJA, R. 3-
110, 3-111.
54. Kevin M. Esterling, Judicial Accountability the Right Way, 82 JUDICATURE 206,
209 (1999) (explaining that judicial performance evaluation commissions "are official
state-sponsored independent agencies with either constitutional or statutory author-
ity, and are funded by legislative appropriation").
55. The various recipients of surveys or questionnaires included lawyers, litigants,
jurors, court personnel, witnesses, judge being evaluated, other judges, appellate
judges, staff attorneys, law clerks, social service or probation case workers, and
others. See Aynes, supra note 43, at 298-302 (discussing the possible sources for eval-
uating judges).
56. For a chart outlining non-survey sources of information used in Alaska, Ari-
zona, Colorado and Utah state judicial evaluation programs, see Esterling, supra note
54, at 210.
57. ABA Special Comm. on Evaluation of Judicial Performance, Concept Paper
(1979) [hereinafter Concept Paper].
58. GUIDELINES, supra note 46.
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named to assist the Committee in its work. 59 By mid-1985, the
ABA adopted the Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial Per-
formance, a document divided into five parts and consisting of
black letter principles, endorsed as approved ABA policy, and
commentary, offered only for "explanatory purposes."60
The preface to the Guidelines emphasized the limitations of the
project: "[T]hese are Guidelines, not blueprints; each jurisdiction
should find them helpful in formulating its own precisely structured
evaluation methods .... [N]o simple 'recipe book,' no one final
precise template, could be produced for all to embrace .... [E]ach
jurisdiction will have to work out its own precise 'recipe."' 61 Yet,
the genuine hope that the Guidelines, as sketchy as they might be,
would cause a renewed scrutiny of bar and media polls was
indisputable:
Without meaning to reflect wholly negatively on all bar polls, or
on all media polls, these Guidelines are intended to spark evalu-
ations that are likely to be more reliable, and that should assure
objectivity that may not be present in much bar or media pol-
ling. As will be seen, polling is not the only means-and not the
soundest means if taken alone-of evaluating the performance
of judges.62
The Guidelines are described as "suggestions for criteria, uses,
and methodology useful for judging the quality and performance of
our judges," but are not to be used as "substitutes for nor... accre-
tions upon the existing Code of Judicial Conduct" nor "principles
to be invoked to discipline a particular judge. '63 As suggested cri-
teria for evaluating judges, the Guidelines provide an excellent list
of standards to determine if a judge meets the requirements of his
or her office and demonstrates appropriate accountability.
VII. GUIDELINE STANDARDS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS,
AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
While the Guidelines are careful to differentiate their purpose
from that of the Code of Judicial Conduct, they acknowledge the
need to draw upon some of the Code's concepts in defining quality
59. Id. at iii.
60. Id. at iii.
61. Id. at iv.
62. Id. Guideline 1-1.3 provides, however, that the guidelines are not "intended to
replace or impair judicial polls conducted by state and local bar associations." Id. at
1-1.3.
63. Id. at iv (emphasis added).
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judicial performance. 64 The seven performance guidelines applica-
ble to all judges refer to all elements of a judge's performance.65
An eighth standard applies only to judges who work with other
judges on multi-judge panels or on administrative matters.66 The
first four guidelines pertain to adjudicative responsibilities and sug-
gest criteria for evaluating conduct by the judge on the bench.67
The fifth and sixth guidelines describe a judge's managerial respon-
sibilities.68 The last guideline addresses a judge's public service
responsibilities.69
A. Standards Related to Adjudicative Responsibilities
The first performance standard, a standard "essential in any...
evaluation of judicial performance '70 mirrors Canon 1 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct in its requirement that judges exercise integrity
and the appearance of integrity.71 To monitor integrity and its ap-
pearance, the Guidelines suggest an evaluation of four criteria:
"avoidance of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety;
freedom from personal bias; ability to decide issues based on the
law and the facts without regard to the identity of the parties or
counsel, the popularity of the decision, and without concern for or
fear of criticism; and impartiality of actions. ' 72 The last criteria,
"impartiality of actions," includes an appraisal of a judge's racial,
gender, or other biases and evenhandedness.73
The second adjudicative guideline measures a judge's knowledge
and understanding of the law.74 This standard also includes four
factors. The judge should understand the "substantive, procedural,
and evidentiary law of the jurisdiction; . . . the factual and legal
issues before the court; and the proper application of judicial pre-
64. Id. at 3-0.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3-8. Guideline 3-8 provides for evaluation based on a judge's effective-
ness in working with other judges, particularly "when ... exchanging ideas and opin-
ions . . . during the decision-making process; soundly criticizing the work of
colleagues; and facilitating the performance of administrative responsibilities of other
judges." Id. at 3-8.
67. Id. at 3-1.
68. Id. at 3-5, 3-6 (guideline 6 pertains to adjudicative and managerial
responsibilities).
69. Id. at 3-7.
70. Id. at 11 cmt.
71. Id. at 3-1.
72. Id. at 3-1.
73. Id. at 12 cmt.
74. Id. at 3-2.
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cedent and other appropriate sources of authority. '75 The judge
should also be able to issue "legally sound decisions. '76 In evalu-
ating a judge's legal knowledge and understanding, evaluators are
cautioned "to disregard their personal feelings about a judge's de-
cision. This criterion measures knowledge of the law; it does not
measure the extent to which the evaluator and the judge possess
the same or harmonious legal philosophies.
77
The third standard for judicial evaluation of adjudicative skills
relates to a judge's oral, written, and nonverbal communications
skills. Under Guideline 3-3, a judge should be evaluated based on
communication skills including "clarity of bench rulings and other
oral communications; quality of written opinions with specific focus
on clarity and logic, and the ability to explain clearly the facts of a
case and the legal precedents at issue; and sensitivity to impact of
demeanor and other nonverbal communications. 78
Lastly, the Guidelines focus on the importance of a positive judi-
cial image. A judge should be evaluated on "preparation, atten-
tiveness, and control over proceedings including... courtesy to all
parties and participants; and willingness to permit every person le-
gally interested in a proceeding to be heard, unless precluded by
law or rules of court. '79 Elaborating on the precise notion of an
appropriate judicial image, the commentary identifies the most im-
portant element of a positive image as judicial temperament. This
judicial temperament includes "patience-but it also includes dig-
nity and understanding. . . . [A] dignified judge can do much to
earn and encourage [public] respect. Conversely, a judge without
good judicial temperament can do great harm to the dignity of the
position.'"°
B. Standards Relating To Managerial Responsibilities
The fifth Guideline relates to a judge's managerial responsibili-
ties.81 The commentary for Guideline 5 cautions against "case
counting" and other imprecise productivity standards,82 but the
Guideline itself recommends evaluation of skills including "devot-
75. Id.
76. Id. at 3-2.2
77. Id. at 13 cmt.
78. Id. at 3-3.
79. Id. at 3-4.
80. Id. at 15 cmt.
81. Id. at 3-5.
82. Id. at 16 cmt. "In short, the measures for this criterion should look beyond the
raw data." Id. at 17 cmt.
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ing appropriate time to all pending matters; discharging adminis-
trative responsibilities diligently; and where responsibility exists for
a calendar, knowledge of the number, age, and status of pending
cases."
83
Promptness and punctuality are the subjects of the sixth Guide-
line.84 It suggests evaluation of "punctuality including: the prompt
disposition of pending matters; and meeting commitments on time
and according to rules of the court."85 The sixth evaluation stan-
dard applies to a judge's managerial and adjudicative
responsibilities.
C. Standards Relating to Professional and Public
Service Responsibilities
Evaluation of a judge's professional and public service centers
on judicial education programs and dedication to public needs.
Thus, Guideline 3-7 provides for evaluation of services to the pro-
fession and the public including "attendance at and participation in
judicial and continuing legal education programs; and consistent
with the highest principles of the law, ensuring that the court is
serving the public to the best of its ability and in such a manner as
to instill public confidence in the court system.
86
VIII. GUIDELINE STANDARDS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION,
AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Some opponents of judicial evaluation systems will complain
that an evaluation system is simply a dressed-up attack on the inde-
pendence of the judiciary.87 If an evaluation system is properly de-
vised and administered, that complaint is without merit.
The previous sections have outlined factors that are legitimate
considerations in determining the quality of a judge's performance
on the bench. Those factors include integrity, freedom from im-
propriety and from the appearance of impropriety, knowledge and
understanding of the law, fairness, preparedness and punctuality,
83. Id. at 3-5.
84. Id. at 3-6.
85. Id. at 3-6.
86. Id. at 3-7. The commentary recognizes the significant contributions made by
judges in other public arenas, but justifies the exclusion of those from the evaluation
criteria in order to avoid "inappropriately penaliz[ing] those judges who are legiti-
mately unable to engage in such extracurricular activities." Id. at 19 cmt.
87. Esterling, supra note 54, at 208 ("[O]ne major concern in judicial performance
evaluations is ensuring the independence of the courts from the will of the
commissioners.").
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diligence, communication skills, managerial skills, and public and
professional service. With very few exceptions, these factors are
identifiable and, arguably, objective. Even those factors that seem
less defined, such as integrity and fairness, can become solid stan-
dards for the measurement of judicial performance under a care-
fully devised evaluation system.
Integrity, for example, is a principle often thought to be basic to
judging.88 A judge who has integrity is a fair judge, an impartial
judge, and a judge who is courageous and dignified in deciding is-
sues brought before the court. In evaluating integrity, a respon-
dent might be asked whether or not the judge engages in ex parte
communications, expresses personal or political favor, prejudges is-
sues or cases, rules with decisiveness, or is affected in rulings by
ethnic, racial, or sexual bias.
New Jersey inquires as to the "evenhanded treatment of attor-
neys, fostering [of] a general sense of fairness, absence of bias
based on race, gender, ethnicity, religion, or social class, and deci-
siveness. 89 Respondents are asked to evaluate the judge on each
factor as either "excellent, more than adequate, adequate, less than
adequate, poor, or not applicable." 9° Connecticut asks for an eval-
uation of the judge's attitude toward all participants in the pro-
ceedings, "women, men, minorities, people of a particular region,
indigent people, local attorneys, minority attorneys, women attor-
neys, and particular attorneys." 91 Alaska evaluates integrity and
impartiality based on four factors: "equal treatment of all parties,
sense of basic fairness and justice, conduct free from impropriety
or appearance of impropriety, and . . . decisions [made] without
regard to possible public criticism." 92
The other factors identified as essential to quality judging are
likewise amenable to measurement. Diligence can be assessed by
asking for an assessment of a judge's "reasonable promptness in
making decisions and willingness to work diligently" in preparation
88. GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 11 cmt. ("It is essential in any program for the
evaluation of judicial performance that integrity be included as a criterion.").
89. N.J. Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial Performance, Second Report on the
Judicial Performance Program 81 (Dec. 1995) (on file in the author's office and with
the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts).
90. Id.
91. State of Conn., Judicial Performance Evaluation Program, Annual Report to
the Chief Court Administrator, Attorney's Questionnaire (1992) (on file in the au-
thor's office and with the Connecticut Judicial Evaluation Administrator).
92. Alaska Judicial Council, 1994 Judicial Evaluation Material 94 (May 1994) (on
file in the author's office and with the Alaska Judicial Council).
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for and during trials and hearings.9 3 Legal knowledge and applica-
tion may be evaluated by inquiring as to the judge's knowledge of
relevant substantive, procedural, and evidence law; ability to ana-
lyze difficult or complex aspects of a case; soundness, clarity, and
completeness of rulings; completeness and accuracy of fact-finding;
and clarity of oral or written decision. 94 The evaluation of manage-
rial skills will completely depend on the nature of the judge's posi-
tion, but might include an appraisal of the judge's skills in docket
management, courtroom control, facilitating settlements or alter-
native dispute resolution methods, and efficient movement of the
proceedings.95
As is true of any attempt to evaluate, whether the subject of the
evaluation be job performance, education performance, applica-
tions, or grant proposals, the cogency of the evaluation system will
be effected by factors that cannot be controlled by the evaluation
system. Some lawyers who have lost cases may give a judge a
lower score on knowledge of the law than the judge deserves.
Some jurors who were angered by having to serve on jury duty may
evaluate a judge's promptness unfairly or even untruthfully. But
those eventualities occur in any evaluative process. Developers of
evaluation instruments have devised methods to reduce any poten-
tial prejudice produced by unfair or dishonest evaluators.96
An objective evaluation of the criticisms leveled by those who
claim that judicial performance evaluations interfere with judicial
independence reveals that the opponents' real concern is with eval-
uations in general, not judicial performance evaluations in particu-
lar. Their criticisms are largely the same as criticisms by those who
decry any attempt at objectifying skills and performance in jobs
involving judgment, discretion, and intellectual application.
Contrasting the factors upon which a legitimate judicial perform-
ance evaluation is based with the factors utilized by those evaluat-
ing judges on illegitimate grounds further proves the point. As
93. Id. Some states have mandatory time limits for disposing of cases. Commen-
tary to Canon 3(A)(5) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct indicates that diligence
is important not only in the disposition of cases but also in a judge's other duties. "At
a minimum, . . . promptness includes starting the judicial proceedings on time and
ending them on time." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(5) cmt.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78; Concept Paper, supra note 57, at 79.
95. Id.
96. Some evaluation systems, for example, allow judges to deselect certain respon-
dents based on their perceived bias against the judge. See Judicial Performance Eval-
uation Methodology for the Tennessee Judicial Performance Evaluation Program (on
file in the author's office and with the Administrative Office of the Courts for the
State of Tennessee).
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discussed in the beginning of this article,97 politicians have, over
the course of this nation's history, attempted to evaluate judges
based upon the outcome of their decisions. Such evaluation boils
down to whether the judge held for or against the criminal defen-
dant or civil plaintiff or found in favor or against capital punish-
ment or punitive damages. No effort is made to analyze the legal
issues, the constitutional requirements, applicable judicial prece-
dent, or legislative mandates in any case. Only the outcome is con-
sidered, in an extreme vacuum, and with the predetermined
judgment that ruling in favor of criminal defendants, civil plaintiffs,
or punitive damages, or against capital punishment is inherently
wrong and constitutes poor judging sufficient to question whether
the judge should continue to serve.
This illegitimate outcome-oriented evaluation has gained more
widespread use. For example, members of Congress have en-
couraged the removal of judges whom they characterize as having
ruled for the defense in death-penalty cases or having ruled against
the tobacco industry.98 Some go so far as to try to quantify the
percentage of a judge's decisions that comport with their preferred
outcome.99 Thus, judges have been criticized for "siding with crim-
inal defendants ... 86% of the time."'10  Chambers of Commerce,
economic teaching institutes, religious organizations, and special
interest groups have all joined the trend of espousing judicial eval-
97. See supra Introduction.
98. These references are to United States Courts of Appeals Judges Rosemary
Barkett and H. Lee Sarokin. Judge Barkett's nomination to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals caused great controversy, but she was eventually confirmed by a
vote of 61-37 in 1995. Judge Sarokin resigned following a series of political attacks
citing the attacks as hampering his ability to render independent decisions. See Judi-
cial Performance Evaluation Methodology for the Tennessee Judicial Performance
Evaluation Program (on file in the author's office and with the Administrative Office
of the Courts for the State of Tennessee).
99. This assertion is not intended to indicate that the author believes that those
who claim to evaluate in this manner are actually interested in evaluating a judge's
performance. See Anthony Lewis, Politicians Play Politics to Intimidate Judges, Nomi-
nees, SUN SENTINEL, Apr. 1, 1997, at 11A. What is important for this discussion is not
their true motivation, but the impression that their public comments makes on the
uninformed electorate.
100. Clint Bolick, Clinton Judges Hold Pro-Defendant Record, USA TODAY Apr. 4,
1996, at 13A; Orrin G. Hatch, Rule of Law: Is Clinton Tough on Crime? Just Look at
His Judges, WALL ST. J., May 1, 1996, at A15. Senator Orrin Hatch, Senate judiciary
committee chair, issued statements against judges based upon their having "written or
joined opinions seeking to free defendants ... or to stretch the law."
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uations based solely on whether the judge held for or against the
side favored by the group.101
When contrasted with the inherent dangers of an evaluation sys-
tem, motivated by political ambition for the purpose of manipulat-
ing an uninformed public and based on nothing but the evaluator's
assessment of present political correctness, the concerns about the
subjectivity of legitimate evaluation factors are infinitesimal. Fur-
thermore, judicial performance evaluations based upon standards
relevant to judging, such as integrity, legal knowledge, diligence,
and fairness, serve not only as a valid and reliable measurement1
0 2
of performance,'0 3 but as a vehicle for judicial self-improvement as
well.104 "A growing body of evidence validates the value of the
evaluation process for individual judges and for the justice system
as a whole.' 0 5
It seems obvious that legitimate factor-based performance evalu-
ations do not threaten the independence of the judiciary. The clear
criteria used in evaluations and the professional development of
reliable and valid methodology10 6 shield the system from the inher-
101. See T. Carter, A Lesson Learned, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 70. The efficacy of
the approach is expressed aptly in the Luntz Research Company's book, The Lan-
guage of the 21st Century, which asserts that "it's almost impossible to go too far when
it comes to demonizing lawyers [and judges].... Few classes of Americans are more
reviled by the general public ... and you should tap into people's anger and frustra-
tion with practitioners of law .... [It] is admittedly a cheap applause line,.., but it
works [so] don't hesitate to resort to ridicule when making your points." The book
formed a part of a plan presented by pollster Frank Luntz to congressional leaders in
1998 for election campaign strategies.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 88-95.
103. Susan Keilitz & Judith White McBride, Judicial Performance Evaluation Come
of Age, STATE COURT J., Winter 1992, at 4. "During 15 years of development, judicial
performance programs have demonstrated usefulness as a means of examining the
performance of individual judges and the judicial system... Programs provide mean-
ingful feedback on fundamental aspects of judicial performance that can be used to
identify ways of improving individual and institutional judicial performance." Id. at
13.
104. Judicial self-improvement is identified as the primary use of judicial perform-
ance evaluations by the ABA Guidelines. GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 1-1.1.
105. Keilitz & McBride, supra note 103, at 13.
106. ABA Special Comm. on Evaluation of Judicial Performance, Issues in Re-
search and Development and Data Collection for Judicial Performance Evaluation
Programs 14 (Apr. 1986).
Reliability and validity are terms with specialized meanings as used by social
scientists. Reliability refers to the accuracy or precision of a measuring in-
strument (i.e, the less the error, the greater the reliability). ...
Validity, as compared with reliability, pertains more to the nature and
meaning of one's variables. Content validity involves examining each item
or question to determine its relevance ....
10752002]
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ent dangers of a decision-based evaluation. In addition to these
intrinsic safeguards, the program can include guidelines that specif-
ically address any perceived threats to independent decision-mak-
ing. The American Bar Association Guidelines, for example,
provide that the evaluation program "should be structured and im-
plemented so as not to impair the independence of the
judiciary.' '1 °7
Performance evaluation programs may include added assurances
that the evaluation process will not usurp judicial independence.
Questionnaires and surveys can be prohibited from including ques-
tions that might allow responses based on the content of judicial
decisions. Judges should be allowed to disqualify certain respon-
dents whose impartiality as an evaluator may reasonably be ques-
tioned. Evaluation methods such as video court observations and
peer assessment can be given proportionately greater weight than
survey and questionnaire responses. By integrating a number of
evaluation techniques, surveying a large spectrum of respondents,
and allowing disqualification in appropriate circumstances, pro-
grams can provide greater assurance that evaluations will not be
based on agreement or disagreement with a judge's decisions. 10 8
IX. FORGING A PARTNERSHIP: SECURING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE By USE OF JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
If the modern-day pastime of judging judges based on whether
one agrees with the outcome of a case continues, 10 9 then those who
value a separate and independent judiciary must act. One method
of exposing the illegitimacy and danger of the outcome-based ap-
proach is to educate the public about the role of judges in a democ-
racy and the importance of a judiciary free of legislative or
executive control. Another appropriate step is to offer the public
an alternative means of evaluating those who serve in the judiciary.
Undoubtedly, much of the success of those who seek to destroy
judicial independence results from the lack of available informa-
tion upon which to base one's decision in judicial elections.
States that have judicial evaluation programs should reevaluate
their programs' goals and ascertain whether the programs, as cur-
107. GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 1-2.
108. See generally Michael A. Hallett, Fostering Public Stewardship of the Courts:
The Tennessee Performance Evalution Study, TENN. B.J., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 20.
109. See, e.g., Joyce Pornick, Metro Matters: Ideology? Well, Who's to Judge? N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2001, at B1.
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rently operating, can provide helpful information to citizens mak-
ing decisions in judicial elections. If the program's self-
improvement goal has required methodologies that are not condu-
cive to a broader use of the evaluations, considerable thought
should be given to revising the program or devising another evalu-
ation program for the purpose of providing voter information.
Those states that do not have judicial evaluation programs in
place should create commissions to consider devising such pro-
grams for the purpose of informing the electorate about the per-
formance of judges who stand for election or retention.110 The
American Bar Association, the National Center for State Courts,
and the American Judicature Society, as well as several states with
judicial performance evaluation programs, offer abundant re-
sources, research, and information for states that are beginning the
process of devising a performance evaluation program. A compre-
hensive judicial performance evaluation bibliography is also
available."'
CONCLUSION
The impetus for the existing state judicial performance evalua-
tion programs was not to provide a response to criticism about an
unaccountable judiciary. Neither were evaluation programs de-
vised to identify appropriate criteria for voters to consider when
deciding how to vote in judicial elections. Nonetheless, the evalua-
tion criteria used in the programs do just that. Like the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, the existing state judicial evaluation pro-
grams identify objective factors that are legitimate considerations
in judging judges. Not only do the criteria give voters an alterna-
tive means of evaluating judges, they also educate and remind the
electorate that good judging involves objective, identifiable crite-
ria, not allegiance to a political philosophy or alliance with popular
sentiment.
110. For a chart outlining some of the different models in place, see Keilitz & Mc-
Bride, supra note 103, at 5-9.
111. For this bibliography and other information, see http://www.ajs.org.
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